Abstract. The development of complex applications that use the Peer-to-Peer computing model is restrained by security and trust management concerns, despite evident performance benefits. An example of such an application of P2P computing is P2P Massive Multi-user Online Games, where cheating by players is simple without centralized control or specialized trust management mechanisms. The article presents new techniques for trust enforcement that use cryptographic methods and are adapted to the dynamic membership and resources of P2P systems. The proposed approach to trust management differs significantly from previous work in the area that mainly used reputation. The paper describes a comprehensive trust management infrastructure for P2P MMO games that enables to recognize and exclude cheating players while keeping the performance overhead as low as possible. While the architecture requires trusted centralized components (superpeers), their role in trust management is limited to a minimum and the performance gains of using the P2P computing model are preserved. The performance of the proposed trust management architecture is validated by a prototype implementation in an MMO game.
Introduction
Apart from file-sharing applications, the Peer-topeer (P2P) computing model has found practical use in distributed directories for applications such as IP telephony, content distribution or P2P backup. The improved performance and availability of the P2P model has proven useful for applications that have to scale to very large numbers of users. However, creating complex P2P applications still faces several obstacles: it is very difficult to solve coordination, reliability, security and trust problems without the use of centralized control. These problems have been overcome in some respects, however, much work still needs to be done before the P2P computing model can be applied to com-plex applications that have high security or reliability requirements.
We consider how the P2P model could be applied to build a Massive Multiplayer Online (MMO) game. At present, scalability issues in MMO games are usually addressed with large dedicated servers or even clusters. According to white papers of a popular multi-player online game -TeraZona [17] -a single server may support 2000 to 6000 simultaneous players, while cluster solutions used in TeraZona support up to 32 000 concurrent players. The client-server approach has a severe weakness, which is the high cost of maintaining the central processing point. Such an architecture is too expensive to support a set of concurrent players that is by an order or two orders of magnitude larger than the current amounts. To give the impression of what scalability is needed -games like Lineage report up to 180 000 concurrent players in one night. MMO games can benefit from the application of the P2P model. However, in a P2P MMO game, issues related to trust become of crucial importance, as shall be shown further in this paper. How can a player be trusted not to modify his own private state to his advantage? How can a player be trusted not to look at the state of hidden objects? How can a player be trusted not to lie, when he is accessing an object that cannot be used unless a condition that depends on the player's private state is satisfied? In this paper, we show how all of these questions can be answered, and present the proposed protocols in detail. We also address performance and scalability issues of the proposed trust management mechanisms, validating the proposed architecture in a practical implementation of a P2P MMO game. The article contains an extended presentation of related work.
The proposed trust management architecture does not use reputation, but relies on cryptographic mechanisms that allow players to verify fairness of moves. Therefore, we call our approach to trust management "trust enforcement". Our trust management architecture for P2P MMO games makes used of trusted central components. It is a hybrid P2P system, the result of a compromise between the P2P and client-server models. A full distribution of the trust management control would be too difficult and too expensive. On the other hand, a return to the trusted, centralized server would obliterate the scalability and performance gains achieved in the P2P MMO game. Therefore, the proposed compromise tries to preserve performance gains while guaranteeing fairness of the game. To this end, our trust management architecture does not require the use of expensive encryption, which could introduce a performance penalty.
A prototype of the proposed trust management architecture [26] has been implemented in a P2P MMO game. The implementation uses FreePastry, a publicdomain implementation of Pastry, as the overlay network, and Scribe for application-layer multicast. The implemented game can be played both on PCs and on mobile phones connected to a Bluetooth access point. The overlay joins both types of nodes together. The performance of implemented trust management mechanisms has been tested using experiments with the prototype.
In the next section, security and trust issues in P2P MMO games are reported and illustrated by possible attack scenarios. Section 3 describes related work. In Section 4, some methods of trust management for P2P MMO games will be proposed. The implementation of some of these methods in the prototype will be described. Section 5 presents a security analysis that demonstrates how the reported security and trust management weaknesses can be overcome using our approach. Section 6 discusses the performance of the presented protocols. The performance has been evaluated by experiments with the prototype, and the results of these experiments are described. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Security issues in P2P MMO games
The attacks described in this section illustrate some of the security and trust management weaknesses of P2P game implementations so far. We shall use a working assumption that the P2P MMO game uses some form of Dynamic Hash Table (DHT) routing in the overlay network, without assuming a specific protocol. In the following section, we describe a trust management architecture that can be used to prevent the attacks described in this section.
Private state: Self-modification
P2P game implementations that allow player to manage their own private state [3] do not exclude the possibility that a game player can deliberately modify his own private state (e.g. experience, possessed objects, location, etc.) to gain advantage over other game players. A player may also alter decisions already made in the past during player-player interaction that may affect the outcome of such an interaction.
Public state: Malicious/illegal modifications
In a P2P MMO game, updates of public state may be handled by a peer who is responsible for a public object. The decision to update public state depends then solely on this peer -the coordinator. Furthermore, the coordinator may perform malicious modifications and multicast illegal updates to the group. The falsified update operation may be directly issued by the coordinator and returned back to the group as a legal update of the state. Such an illegal update may also be issued by another player that is in a coalition with the coordinator, and accepted as a legal operation.
Attack on the replication mechanism
When state is replicated in a P2P game, replication players are often selected randomly (using the properties of the overlay to localize replicated data in the virtual network). This can be exploited when the replication player can directly benefit from the replica of the knowledge he/she is storing (i.e. the replication player is in the region of interest and has not yet discovered the knowledge by himself).
Attack on P2P overlays
In a P2P overlay (such as Pastry), a message is routed to the destination node through other intermediary nodes. The messages travel in open text and can be easily eavesdropped by competing players on the route. The eavesdropped information can be especially valueable if a player is revealing his own private state to some other player (player-player interaction). In such case, the eavesdropping player will find out whether the interacting players should be avoided or attacked.
The malicious player may also deliberately drop messages that he is supposed to forward. Such an activity will obstruct the game to some extent, if the whole game group is relatively small.
Conclusion from described attacks
Considering all of the attacks described in this chapter, a game developer may be tempted to return to the safe model of a trusted, central server. The purpose of this article is to show that this is not completely necessary. The trust management architecture presented in the next section will require trusted centralized components. However, the role of these components, and therefore, the performance penalty of using them, can be minimized. Thus, the achieved architecture is a compromise between the P2P and client-server models that is secure and benefits from increased scalability due to the distribution of most game activities.
Related work

Massive multiplayer online games
Role-playing games constitute a category of multiplayer games, where the player assumes the role of a character in a virtual world. The game is most often based on some exciting stories or fables, where the players compete playing the role of such characters as: humans, elves, magicians or priests. The idea of the typical game is to accomplish various missions or quests with the controlled character, which involves certain typical types of operations. The character travels within the virtual world and interacts with other characters or objects. The knowledge of the virtual world possessed by the player may either increase with time as the player travels or remain constrained to just the closest surroundings. Early in the game, most of the virtual world remains unknown and the player has no knowledge where objects are located. By collecting objects and interacting with other characters (fighting, making friends, etc.) a player may, for instance, improve certain skills, accumulate experience, earn money or collect weapons or magic spells. All these properties can be used to improve the position over competing players. In most of RPG games the player accumulates ranking points that represent the result of his past competition with other characters. The objective is to survive within the virtual world and gain better ranking than other game players.
Massive Multiplayer Online games allow many players to interact using a client-server model. The virtual world, as well as the player's characters, is managed by a central server. In many games, there can be many servers that maintain separate virtual worlds. However, a single server's scalability is limited to tens of thousands of users (even for commercial versions of the game). MMO game servers support a considerably higher number of users than multiplayer versions of other, more interactive games (such as firstperson shooters). This improved scalability is achieved by limiting the scope and type of interactivity of the game [3] , and by dividing the large number of players into separate game groups (sessions) with maintainable number of players each. This is reasonable for types of games where the virtual world can be divided in multiple parallel sub-levels between which players move for instance on promotion-based manner (Warcraft III, Quake). Despite this limitation, MMO games are very popular and offer an attractive gaming experience. The most prominent examples of MMO RPG games include: EverQuest, Ultima Online, There.com, Star Wars Galaxies, The Sims Online or Warcraft III.
P2P MMO games
Several multi-player games (MiMaze, Age of Empires) have already been implemented using the P2P model. However, the scalability of such approaches is in question, as the game state is broadcasted between all players of the game. AMaze [5] is an example of an improved P2P game design, where the game state is multicast only to nearby players. Still in both cases, only the issue of public state maintenance has been addressed. The questions how to deal with the private and public concealed states have not been answered (see Section 4) .
The authors of [4] have proposed a method of private state maintenance that is similar to ours. They propose the use of commitments and of a trusted "observer", who verifies the game online or at the end of the game. However, the authors of [4] have not considered the problem of concealed or conditional state. Therefore, their trust management architecture is incomplete. Also, the solution proposed in [4] did not address games implemented in the P2P model. In [24] , the subject of fair ordering of public state updates has been considered that makes it impossible for players to cheat, while taking into account different network communication delays. This method can be used in P2P games that use peers to manage public objects, such as in the design of [3] .
The paper on P2P support for MMO games [3] offers an interesting perspective on implementing MMO games using the P2P model. The presented approach addresses mostly performance and availability issues, while leaving many security and trust issues open. In this paper, we discuss protocols that can be applied to considerably improve the design of Knutsson in terms of security and trust management. In [24] , a P2P approach to MMO games has also been proposed, again without taking into account issues of security and trust management.
Trust management using reputation
One of the most common forms of trust management is the use of agent reputations. Among many applications of this approach, the most prominent are on-line auctions (Allegro, E-Bay). However, P2P file sharing networks such as Kazaa, Mojo Nation, Freenet also use reputation. Reputation systems have been widely researched in the context of multi-agent programming,, social networks, and evolutionary games [20] [21] [22] [23] .
Reputation-based mechanisms could be used in P2P games. A player would receive a reputation based on a history of previous games, and this reputation could be used to exclude cheating players from a game. The reason for the use of reputation mechanisms in many networked applications is the lack of enforcement mechanisms that could be used to provide trust management, as noted in [20] .
Any reputation system has certain systematic drawbacks that are a reason why it may be worth avoiding to rely on reputation systems in P2P games. Among these, the most important is the problem of first-time cheating. Any peer may build up a high reputation and then cheat in order to win in a game (for example, behave fairly in unimportant encounters, and cheat during a critical encounter).
Cryptographic research
Cryptography has considered the problems of fair agreements, games, and multi-party computations. There has been research on the problem of "mental poker", or fair implementation of a distributed poker game [25] . The protocol allows for fair drawing of cards in a poker game, however, it assumes that the game players do not leave the game and is therefore unsuitable for P2P applications. Protocols on fair agreement using a third party are utilized in our research. Multi-party computation allows to calculate an algebraic function of inputs supplied by several parties without revealing the inputs and without centralized control. The research so far in this area requires that the function should be expressed as a Boolean circuit. Applications of multi-party computation in our research are a problem of future work.
Trust enforcement for P2P MMO games
In this section, we propose a trust management architecture for P2P MMO games. Before the details of the proposed architecture will be described, let us shortly discuss the used concepts of "trust" and "trust management".
Trust enforcement
In much previous research, the notion of trust has been directly linked to reputation that can be seen as a measure of trust. However, some authors [20, 23] have already defined trust as something that is distinct from reputation. In this paper, trust is defined (extending the definition of [20] ) as a subjective expectation of an agent about the behavior of another agent. This expectation relates the behavior of the other (trusted) agent to a set of normative rules of behavior, usually related to a notion of fairness or justice. In the context of electronic games, fair behavior is simply defined as behavior that obeys all rules of the game. In other words, an agent trusts another agent if the agent believes that the other agent will behave according to the rules of the game.
Trust management is used to enable trust. Reputation systems are a type of trust management mechanism that assigns a computable measure of trust to any agent on the basis of the observed or reported history of that agent's behavior. However, any mechanism that allows to determine who can, and who cannot be trusted, is a trust management mechanism.
Our approach to trust management does not rely on reputation, which is usually vulnerable to first-time cheating. We have attempted to use cryptographic methods for verification of fair play, and have called this approach "trust enforcement". To further explain this approach to trust management, consider a simple "real-life" analogy. In many commercial activities (like clothes shopping) the actors use reputation (brand) for trust management. On the other hand, there exist reallife systems that require and use trust management, but do not use reputation. Consider car traffic as an example. Without trust in the fellow drivers, we would not be able to drive to work every day.
However, we do not know the reputation of these drivers. One of the reasons why we trust them is the existence of a mechanism (the police) that enforces penalties for traffic law violations (the instinct for selfpreservation seems to be weak in some drivers). This mechanism does not operate permanently or ubiquitously, but rather irregularly and at random. However, it is (usually) sufficient to enable trust.
Note that the issue of what to do with those who violate fair rules is beyond the scope of our research. We propose simply that players in a P2P MMO game that have cheated should be excluded from the game, but this is by no means the only possible approach. Another possible approach could be to calculate reputation of players based on the results of fairness verification, and to allow other players to decide whether they want to interact with cheating players.
The proposed trust management architecture
The trust management architecture proposed in this paper is visualized on Fig. 1 . It uses several cryptographic primitives such as commitment protocols and secret sharing. It also uses certain distributed computing algorithms, such as Byzantine agreement protocols. These primitives shall not be described in detail in this paper for lack of space. The reader is referred to [8] [9] [10] [11] . The relationships between the components of the trust management architecture will be described in this section. Note that the modular design of our the architecture makes it possible to implement selected trust management mechanisms; this is the approach that has been chosen in our prototype implementation.
Our trust management architecture for P2P MMO games will use partitioning of game players into groups, like in the approach of [3] . A group is a set of players who are in the same region. All of these players can interact with each other. However, players may join or depart from a group at any time. Each group must have a trusted coordinator, who is not a member of the group (he can be chosen among the players of another region or be provided by the game managers). The coordinator must be trusted because of the necessity of verifying private state modifications (see below). However, the purpose of the trust management architecture is to limit the role of the coordinator to a minimum. Thus, the performance gains from using the P2P model may still be achieved, without compromising security or decreasing trust. In an implementation of the proposed trust management architecture, complexity can be decreased by assigning more functions to the trusted coordinator. However, this makes the implementation more centralized.
Game play scenarios using proposed trust management architecture
Let us consider a few possible game play scenarios and describe how the proposed trust management mechanisms would operate. In the described game scenarios that are typical for most MMO games, the game state can be divided into four categories:
Public state is all information that is publicly available to all players and such that its modifications by any player can be revealed.
Private state is the state of a game player that cannot be revealed to other players, since this would violate the rules of the game.
Conditional state is state that is hidden from all players, but may be revealed and modified if a condition is satisfied. The condition must be public (known to all players) and cannot depend on the private state of a player.
Concealed state is like conditional state, only the condition of the state's access depends on the private state of a player. 
Player joins a game
From the bootstrap server or from a set of peers, if threshold PKI is used, the player must receive an ID and a public key certificate C = {ID, Kpub, sjoin} (where sjoin is the signature of the bootstrap server (or the peers), and Kpub is the public key that forms a pair with the secret key kpriv,) that allows strong and efficient authentication (see next section. Note that the keys will not be used for data encryption, only for signatures). The player selects a game group and reports to its coordinator (who can be found using DHT routing). The coordinator receives the player's certificate. The player's initial private state (or the state with which he joins the game after a period of inactivity) is verified by the coordinator. The player receives a verification certificate (VC) that includes a date of validity and is signed by the coordinator.
Player verifies his private state
In a client-server game, the game server maintains all private state of a user, which is inefficient. In the P2P solution, each player can maintain his own private state [3] , causing trust management problems. We have tried to balance between the two extremes. It is true that a trusted entity (the coordinator) must oversee modifications of the private state. However, it may do so only infrequently. Periodically or after special events, a player must report to the coordinator for verification of his private state. The coordinator receives the initial (recently published) private state values and a sequence of modifications that he may verify and apply on the known private state. For each modification, the player must present a proof. If the verification fails, the player does not receive a confirmation of success. If it succeeds, the player is issued a VC that has an extended date of validity and is signed by the coordinator. Verification by a coordinator is done by "replaying" the game of the user from the time of the last verification to the present. The proofs submitted by the player must include the states of all objects and players that he has interacted with during the period.
Note that a verification may be performed for just a part of the private state, and the issued VC may specify which elements of the private state have been verified. Verification may also, for efficiency reasons, be performed for just a random part of the period, if the player submits all intermediate state changes.
After verification, the player maintains and modifies his own state. As shall be explained below, the player collects testimonies from other players that are sufficient to prove the correctness of his private state modifications.
Player interacts with a public object
Peer-to-peer overlays (like DHTs) provide an effective infrastructure for routing and storing of public knowledge within the game group. Any public object of the game is managed by some peer. The player issues modification requests to the manager M of the public object. The player also issues a commitment of his action A that can be checked by the manager. A commitment protocol works by publishing a value (the commitment) for each operation on the private state. The commitment could be, for example, a hash function of an object. The commitment is used when a player needs to prove that his private state has not been illegally modified. Let us denote the commitment by C(ID, A) (the commitment could be a hash function of some value, signed by the player).
Commitments should be issued whenever a player wishes to access any object, and for decisions that affect his private state. Commitments may also be used for random draws [1] . It will be useful to regard commitments as modifications of public state that is maintained for each player by a peer that is selected using DHT routing, as for any public object.
The request includes the action that the player wishes to execute, and the player's validation certificate, VC. Without a valid certificate, the player should not be allowed to interact with the object. If the certificate is valid, and the player has issued a correct commitment of the action, the manager updates his state and broad-casts an update message. The manager also sends a signed testimony T = {t, A, Si, Si + 1, P, sM} to the player. This message includes the time t and action A, state of the public object before (Si) and after the modification (Si + 1) and some information P about the modifying player (f. ex., his location). The player should verify the signature sM of the manager on the testimony. The manager of the object then sends an update of the object's state to the game group.
If any player (including the modifying player, if T is incorrect) rejects the update (issues a veto), the coordinator sends T to the protesting player, who may withdraw his veto. If the veto is upheld, a Byzantine agreement round is started. (This kind of Byzantine agreement is known as the Crusader's protocol.) Note that if a game player has just modified the state of a public object and has not yet sent an update, he may receive another update that is incorrect, but will not veto this update, but send another update with a higher sequence number.
To decide whether an update of the public state is correct, players should use the basic physical laws of the game. For example, the players could check whether the modifying player has been close enough to the object. Players should also know whether the action could be carried out by the modifying player (for example, if the player cuts down a tree, he must possess an axe). This decision may require knowledge of the modifying player's private state. In such a case, the modification should be accepted if the modifying player will undergo validation of his private state and present a validation certificate that has been issued after the modification took place. In other words, the modification must be checked by a trusted entity: the group coordinator. This approach, used in the prototype implementation, can be used instead of Byzantine agreements whenever a veto is issued.
Player executes actions that involve
randomness For example, the player may search for food or hunt. The player uses a fair random drawing protocol [1] (usually, to obtain a random number). This involves the participation of a minimal number (for instance, at least 3) of other players that execute a secret sharing together with the drawing player. The drawing player chooses a random share l0 and issues a commitment of his share C(ID, l0) to the manager of his commitments (that are treated as public state). The drawing player receives and keeps signed shares p1,. . . ,pn from the other players, and uses them to obtain a random number. The result of the drawing can be obtained from information that is part of constant game state (drawing tables).
Player meets and interacts with another player
For example, let two players fight. The interaction must be overseen by an arbiter, who can be any player. The two players should first check their validation certificates and refuse the interaction if the certificate of the other player is not valid. The VCs of the players are also examined by the arbiter to avoid that one of the players denies the interaction by falsely claiming that his opponent's VC is invalid. Before the interaction takes place, both players may carry out actions A1,. . . ,Ak that modify their private state (like choosing the weapon they will use). The players must issue commitments of these actions. The commitments must also be sent to the arbiter. The actions remain secret until they can be used to improve the game result of a player. Then, the actions and relevant private state are revealed, and commitments can be used to prove correctness. The arbiter will record the commitments and the revealed actions (as shown on Fig. 2) . After the interaction is completed, the arbiter will send both players a signed testimony about the interaction.
If the interaction involves randomness, the players draw a common random number using a fair drawing protocol (they both supply and reveal shares; shares may also be contributed by other players).
Finally, the players reveal their actions to each other and to the arbiter. The results of the interaction are also obtained from fixed game information and affect the private states of both players. The players must modify their private states fairly, otherwise they will fail verification in the future (this includes the case if a player dies. Player death is a special case. It is true that once a player is dead, he can continue to play until his VC expires. This can be corrected if the player who killed him informs the group about his death. Such a death message forces any player to undergo immediate verification if he wishes to prove that he is not dead). Note that at any time, both players are aware of the fair results of the interaction, so that a player who has won the fight may refuse further interactions with a player who decides to cheat. player will modify his private state after he finds out the chest's contents. To determine the outcome, the player will reconstruct conditional or concealed state.
Conditional and concealed state can be managed using secret sharing and commitment protocols, as described in [1] . The protocol developed in [1] concerned drawing from a finite set, but can be extended to handle any public condition. However, concealed state has not been considered in our previous research on fairness of P2P games. Therefore, we needed to extend and modify our results in order to provide trust management of concealed state.
The protocol for concealed and conditional state management has been shown on Figs 3 and 4. It is divided into two phases. The distribution phase needs to be executed by the coordinator whenever a concealed public object is renewed or created (step 1 on Fig. 3) . The coordinator divides the object into a fixed number of shares (step 3) that are sent to chosen players (shareholders in step 5), and to a number of replication players who are not members of the group (this is done in step 4 to decrease the likelihood of coalitions). The coordinator also calculates hash values of the shares that are public state (step 8). Apart from the initializing of the state, the coordinator does not participate in its management.
The shareholders may leave the game at any time, and the object parts from the replication players are used instead. If there are not enough parts to reconstruct an object, the object must be renewed by the coordinator. This replication approach is more resistant to coalitions than the approach proposed in [3] (relying on Pastry). Replicating the object parts by random players from the group increases the likelihood that one shareholder will receive more than one part. Then, this shareholder may form a coalition with a smaller number of other players to reconstruct the object. Also, the backup mechanism used in [3] may increase the number of object parts kept by a single player. The protocol described here can also be used for random draws from a finite set (see [1] ).
The second phase of the protocol is the reconstruction phase. In step 1 on Fig. 4 , the player issues a commitment of his action C(ID, A) that is checked by the shareholders. If the condition is public but depends on the player's private state, the player decides himself in step 2 whether the condition is fulfilled (he will have to prove the condition's correctness during verification in the future). In this case, the issued commitment must also commit the player's private state before the object is accessed (the player must also keep a copy of the relevant private state). If the condition to access an object is secret, the condition itself should be treated as a conditional public object. After the player checks that the condition is fulfilled, he requests and receives the object shares (steps 3 and 4) and, after verifying that the shares are correct, reconstructs the concealed or conditional object (steps 5 and 6).
When the player has reconstructed the object, he must keep the shares for verification. At the same time, the testimony issued by the shareholders will include a value of the condition that will allow the coordinator to verify the answer of the player. The elements of private state that may constitute a zero-knowledge condition should be defined during game design.
Note that concealed and conditional public objects can have states that are modified by players. If this is the case, then each state modification must be followed by the distribution phase of the protocol for object management.
Authentication requirements
A P2P game could use many different forms of authentication. At present, most P2P applications use weak authentication based on nick names and IP addresses (or IDs that are derived from such information). However, it has been shown that such systems are vulnerable to the Sybil attack [13] .
Most of the mechanisms discussed in this paper would not work if the system would be compromised using the Sybil attack. An attacker that can control an arbitrary number of clones under different IDs could use these clones to cheat in a P2P game. The only way to prevent the Sybil attack is to use a strong form of authentication, such as based on public-key cryptography. Public key cryptography will be used in our trust management architecture for authentication and digital signatures of short messages, but not for encryption.
In a P2P game, authentication must be used efficiently. In other words, it should not be necessary to repeatedly authenticate peers. The use of authentication could depend on the game type. For instance, in a closed game, authentication could occur only before the start of the game. Once all players are authenticated, they could agree on a common secret (such as a group key) that will be used to identify game players, using a method such as the Secure Group Layer (SGL) [15] . Alternatively, these users could exchange public keys.
Let us briefly discuss here how such an authentication could be implemented. The well-known solution is the PKI infrastructure. This solution also has the advantage of direct availability and possibility of implementation. However, developers of P2P games may be concerned about the single point of failure, lack of anonymity, or insufficient security of PKI [14] . The use of global PKI is unnecessary, since the bootstrap game server may issue certificates for players that are later used for authentication. There may exist solutions better suited to the needs of P2P games, such as the Web-of-Trust model, or solutions based on trust graphs. Also, we recognize that the use of local names as proposed in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SP-KI) [16] is more suited to P2P applications and should be a more scalable approach for P2P games. Another solution that is well suited to the P2P model is the use of threshold cryptography for distributed PKI [19] .
Security analysis
In this section, the attacks illustrated in previous paragraphs will be used to demonstrate how the proposed protocols protect the P2P MMO game.
Private state: Self-modification
Self-modification of private state can concern the parameters of a player, the player's secret decisions that affect other players, or results of random draws. The first type of modification is prevented by the need to undergo periodic verification of a private player's parameters. The verification is done by the coordinator on the basis of an audit trail of private state modification that must be managed by any player. Each modification requires proof signed by third parties (managers of other game objects, arbiters of player interactions). Any modification that is unaccounted for will be rejected by the coordinator. Players may verify that their partners are fair by checking a signature of the coordinator on the partner's private state. If a player tries to cheat during an interaction with another player by improving his parameters, he may succeed, but will not pass the subsequent verification and will be rejected by other players.
Modification of player's move decisions or results of random draws is prevented by the use of commitment protocols. The verification is made by an arbiter, who can be a randomly selected player. The verification is therefore subject to coalition attacks; on the other hand, making the coordinator responsible for this verification would unnecessarily increase his workload.
Note that in order for verification to succeed, the coordinator must possess the public key certificates of all players who have issued proof about the player's game. (If necessary, these certificates can be obtained from the bootstrap server). However, the players who have issued testimony need not be online during verification.
A player may try to cheat the verification mechanism by "forgetting" the interactions with objects that have adversely affected the player's state. This approach can be defeated in the following way. A player that wishes to access any object may be forced to issue a commitment in a similar manner as when a player makes a private decision. The commitment is checked by the manager of the object and must include the time and type of object. Since the commitment is made prior to receiving the object, the player cannot know that the object will harm him. The coordinator may check the commitments during the verification stage to determine whether the player has submitted information about all state changes.
Public state: Malicious/illegal modifications
We have suggested the use of Byzantine algorithms further supported by a veto mechanism (Crusader's protocol) to protect public state against illegal/malicious modifications. Any update request on the public state shall be multicast to the whole game group. The Byzantine verification within the group shall only take place when at least one of the players vetoes the update request of some other player. The cheating player as well as the player using the veto in unsubstantiated cases may be both penalized by the group by exclusion from the game (see Fig. 5 ). Such mechanism will act mostly as a preventive and deterring measure, introducing the performance penalty only on an occasional-basis.
The protection offered by Byzantine agreement algorithms has been discussed in [9] . It has been shown that the algorithms tolerate up to a third of cheating players (2N + 1 honest players can tolerate N cheating players). Therefore, any illegal update on the public state will be excluded as long as the coalition of the players supporting the illegal activity does not exceed third of the game group. We believe such protection is far more secure than coordinator-based approach presented in [3] and tolerable in terms of performance. Performance could be further included if hierarchical Byzantine protocols are used [18] . 
Attacks on P2P overlays
In our security architecture, players do not reveal sensitive information. A player does not disclose his own private state, but only commitments of this state. Concealed or conditional state is not revealed until a player receives all shares. If the P2P overlay is operating correctly and authentication is used to prevent Sybil attacks, the P2P MMO game should be resistant to eavesdropping by nodes that route messages without resorting to strong encryption. A secure channel is needed during the verification of a players private state by the coordinator.
Concealed state: Attack on replication mechanism
Concealed state, as well as any public state in the game, must be replicated among the peers to be protected against loss. The solution offered in [3] uses the natural properties of the Pastry network to provide replication. However, we have questioned the use of this approach for concealed state, where the replicas cannot be stored by a random peer. The existence of concealed state has not been considered in [3] , and therefore the authors of [3] did not consider the fact that replicas may reveal the concealed information to unauthorized players.
In our approach for replication of concealed state, replication players are selected from outside the game group. This eliminates the benefits offered by Pastry network. On the other hand, this approach also eliminates the security risks. Please note that in our approach a certain number of players must participate to uncover specific concealed information. Therefore, a coalition with the replication player is not beneficial for a player within the game group.
Revocation of verification certificates
Verification is performed by trusted group coordinators that can be superpeers operated by the game provider. However, it is possible that the a malicious player could somehow set up a malicious coordinator and therefore defeat the verification mechanism. To avoid this, the superpeers should be equipped with public key certificates that are signed by other superpeers (using a Web-of-Trust model, or by a signle central authority). When a Verification Certificate is examined by a player, the player should check the superpeers signature. To do this, the player should obtain or posess the superpeers public key certificate, and validate this certificate.
Performance analysis
Analysis of the trust management architecture
We have tried to manage trust in a P2P MMO game without incurring a performance penalty that would question the use of the P2P model. However, some performance costs are associated with the proposed mechanisms. Our initial assumption about partitioning of game players into groups (sets of players who are in the same region) is required for good performance.
Byzantine protocols have a quadratic communication cost, when a player disagrees with the proposed decision. Therefore, their use in large game groups may be prohibitive. This problem may be solved by restricting the Byzantine agreement to a group of superpeers that maintain the public state (an approach already chosen by a few P2P applications, such as OceanStore). Another possibility is the use of hierarchical Byzantine protocols that allow the reduction of cost but require hierarchy maintenance.
Since private state is still managed by a player, it incurs no additional cost over the method of Knutsson. The additional cost is related to the verification of a player's private state by a coordinator. The coordinator must "replay" the game of a player, using provided information, and verifying the proofs (signatures) of other players, as well as the modifications of the verified private state. This process may be costly, but note that a coordinator need not "replay" all of the game, but only a part (chosen at random). This may keep the cost low, while still deterring players from self-modification of private state.
The cost of maintenance of concealed or conditional state is highest in the initialization phase. This stage should be carried out only when an object is renewed. (when the object's state changes). The expense of this protocol may be controlled by reducing the constant number of object parts, at the cost of decreasing security. The number of object parts cannot be less than two. Table 1 shows a performance analysis of the most complex protocols in our trust management architecture: the protocols for management of concealed state. In the table, N is the number of objects (of concealed or conditional state); s -the number of shareholders; m*k -the number of replication players; and l -the number of objects stored by a peer. Note that computational cost of the distribution stage is complex -but this stage should be carried out only when an object is renewed. During most game operations, the cost of concealed state management is reasonable. The reconstruction phase has a constant const (fetching the parts of an object).
All the proposed protocols have allowed us to realize one goal: limit the role of the central trusted component of the system (the coordinator). The coordinator does not have to maintain any state for the players. He participates in the game occasionally, during distribution of concealed/conditional state and during verification of private state. The maintenance of public state remains distributed, although it requires a higher communication overhead.
Prototype P2P MMO game
The proposed architecture has been implemented in a prototype P2P MMO game. We have chosen this approach, rather than simulation, since we wanted to evaluate architecture in a more realistic setting. Implementing the proposed mechanisms in a real game has the advantage that all practical implementation issues need to be worked out, rather than implementing a more abstract version of the protocols in a simulator. The disadvantage is a smaller scale of testing and a more complex performance evaluation. However, the chosen approach has resulted in several practical performance improvements of the proposed architecture.
The prototype P2P MMO game has been implemented using FreePastry and Scribe. The game could be run on mobile phones that accessed the Internet by Bluetooth. Since it turned out that running FreePastry on mobile phones was impossible due to the limited memory and processor speed, peers on mobile phones were connected to a single FreePastry node running on a Bluetooth access point with dual stack that was also connected to the Internet. Thus the network infrastructure was not a true ad-hoc Bluetooth network, but a hybrid network of Bluetooth and fixed links. The nodes running on Bluetooth access points acted on behalf of peers running on mobile phones.
As described in the architecture of P2P MMO games, the game should be divided into regions, and all players in a region constituted a group and joined a single Scribe topic. Each group has a common address prefix, allowing nodes of the group to be close to each other in the Pastry overlay. Each group had one trusted superpeer that could have different functions. Depending on configuration, the superpeer could be responsible only for the verification of private states of players, or additionally for the management of all public object in the game.
The P2P MMO game had no concealed or conditional public state. Location information was considered public state. All players managed their own private state and submitted to verification every time they needed to interact with a public object or with another player (instead of periodic verification -this form of verification is more strict than proposed in the original architecture). Public objects were managed by chosen peers -either by the superpeer, or by peers that were chosen by the superpeer and explicitly indicated to other peers in the group. This approach allowed for a transfer of trust from the superpeer to the manager of public objects and also limited the impact of attacks on overlay routing, since the chosen manager had to sign all of his messages using public key cryptography, and his public key was signed by the superpeer during the trust transfer. The implemented prototype allowed for performance evaluation of the proposed mechanisms for private and public state management in the trust management architecture.
For evaluation purposes, a automatic game playing agent has been implemented that could move at random and interact with objects or other players. For simplification, the game was modified to allow the automatic agent to access all objects and all other player, regard- less of his location (otherwise, it would be necessary to implement complex movement algorithms, which was not necessary for performance evaluation).
Performance evaluation
Performance evaluation was carried out by running multiple automatic game playing agents on single hosts. A total of 11 hosts was used in the experiment, one of which was used to run the superpeer. The hosts all had 512 MB of main memory and 1 GHz or 1.8 GHz processors. All hosts were connected by a 100 Mbit Fast Ethernet local network. Since the purpose of the performance test was to evaluate the overhead of the implemented trust management mechanisms, a simulation of a WAN was not required.
The experiment focused on a comparison of performance of the P2P MMO game with and without trust enforcement. Trust enforcement could be turned off, and then all private state modifications were done by peers without verification, and all public object accesses and peer interactions proceeded unconditionally. The results of this part of the experiment was considered as a reference point for comparison with the same simulation with trust enforcement mechanisms turned on.
Only the performance results of the game in a stable state, with churn near to zero (about 1 percent), has been considered in the evaluation. One of the reasons for this decision was that FreePastry and Scribe turned out to be very unstable under higher churn. Another reason was that with low churn, the reference performance of the game without trust management improved and stabilized, and therefore the evaluation of the performance overhead of trust management was more reliable.
For the purpose of increasing the number of nodes, multiple game agents were run on single hosts. However, here the scalability of the experiment was limited by FreePastry and Scribe. It turned out that it was not possible to run many nodes of FreePastry and Scribe on a single computer (regardless of the operating system, although performance was slightly better on Windows than on Linux). The maximum working number of nodes on a single host was about 50, however this amount of nodes resulted in very unstable performance. Therefore, in the experiment the number of game agents on a single host was in the range of 10-40, thus limiting the total number of nodes in the game group to about 400. Therefore, the experiment was run with the following group sizes: 100, 200 and 400 peers.
For the evaluation experiment, one region was created in the game, and this region had one coordinator (trusted superpeer). The superpeer was responsible for verification of private state. Every verification request to the superpeer consisted of the following operations:
-Routing the request to the superpeer through the overlay -Finding the client in a data structure -Verifying the clients' private state -Creating and signing the verification certificate Public state was managed by the superpeer or by peers chosen by the superpeer (who could change his decision over time, thus distributing the load between peers or allowing for peer departures). Regardless of who managed the public state, every request for public state access resulted in the following operations:
-Routing the request to the manager through the overlay -Finding the object in a data structure -Checking the signature on the verification certificate -Checking the position of the accessing player (for evaluation, this stage was modified so that it al- ways allowed access. However, the same amount of operations was carried out as in the normal game.) -Determining the results of the interaction These two types of requests, the verification request and interaction request, have been used to evaluate the performance of the trust management architecture. As described above, the trust enforcement mechanisms could be turned off. The experiment used the times of game operations with trust enforcement mechanisms as a reference value for the comparison with the game operation times that included time for trust management mechanisms of the verification and interaction requests. The time overhead is of crucial importance as a performance criterion in a game, since the game was interactive, and increasing the time of executing game operations could lead to poor game quality. Figures 6 and 7 show the times of game operations that required private state verification or public object interaction, respectively. The two types of bars on the figures correspond to running the tests with trust enforcement turned off (black bar labeled "NT", short for "No Trust") and with trust enforcement running (gray bar labeled "TE", short for "Trust Enforcement"). 5 types of tests are shown on the figures. The first parameter of each of these tests is the size of the game group: 100, 200 or 400 peers. The second parameter controls whether public state was managed by the superpeer (centralized) or distributed to other peers.
The results show that the delay increase due to using trust enforcement is significant, but for most cases, the game response times are within 1 second. This is a quite acceptable delay in MMO games. Note that in a Wide Area Network, the networking delays could well dominate over the delay increase due to using cryptography in trust enforcement.
Since the verification and interaction requests use Pastry overlay routing, the delay increase due to the use of trust enforcement increases with the increase of the game group size. It can be noticed that this increase is roughly logarithmic. The median time increases by about 100 milliseconds for exponential increases of the group size. This corresponds to the known theoretical results concerning Pastry routing.
Distributing the functions of public state management from the superpeer to other peers has a twofold effect. First, the median time required for public state interaction requests (when trust enforcement is used) increases by 200-300 milliseconds. This is due to the fact that the superpeer is usually better connected in the overlay than other peers, and the access time of other peers can be longer. On the other hand, the median time required for private state verification decreases by 70-80 milliseconds. This is due to the fact that the superpeer has a smaller computational load and can handle verification requests faster.
The results presented on Figs 6 and 7 showed the median response times. The distribution of response times resembles a heavy-tailed distribution. Some example distributions are shown on Fig. 8 . The Figure shows the times of game operations that required private state verification when trust enforcement was turned on, and management of public state was done by the superpeer. Distributions of times for three different group sizes are shown; it can be seen that increasing the group size increases the response time, but that this effect is limited and the increase from 200 to 400 peers does not significantly alter the distribution of response times. This confirms the theoretical properties of communication in DHT-based overlays. It can be seen, however, that increasing the group size leads to a narrowing of the distribution around its median value, which can be interpreted as follows: the delay for overlay routing begins to dominate in the response time over the other costs.
Distributing public state management from the superpeer reduces the number of requests for public state interaction at the superpeer. This effect is shown on Fig. 9 . The Figure shows the percentage of all interaction requests that are served by the superpeer. The line close to 100% is obtained when the public state is managed exclusively by the superpeer. (The line is not equal to 100% because some of the interaction requests are lost -probably due to the high load of the superpeer that could refuse to process a request.) The lower line is obtained when public state is distributed among peers (the superpeer participates in sharing the load). It can be seen that the distribution is effective and obtains fair load balancing regardless of the group size. There were a total of 11 peers (including the superpeer) that could be selected as managers of public state. Therefore, the percentage of interaction requests that was observed at the superpeer -about 9% -reflects a good quality of load balancing. A similar load was observed on other peers. However, note that keeping public state management at the superpeer reduces the need for transferring trust to other peers.
Summary of performance evaluation
The practical implementation of the proposed trust management framework has demonstrated that it is possible to use trust enforcement in real P2P MMO games. The observed delays of game actions due to the use of trust enforcement were within 1 second for group sizes of up to 400 peers. While these are small groups (it was not possible to simulate larger ones with the available equipment, due to performance limitations of FreePastry), the observed increase of delays was logarithmic, indicating that (if the trend observed for group sizes of 100, 200 and 400 would continue), a group of the order of magnitude of 10000 should not observe an increase in game action times due to trust enforcement that would be larger than 2 seconds. This is still a delay that could be tolerated by players. Note also that the results of performance evaluation indicate that as group sizes increase, the time needed for overlay routing begins to dominate over the delays due to the use of cryptography in trust enforcement.
The experiments confirmed that the distribution of public state management from the superpeer to other peers is necessary and can achieve fair load balancing. Note that we have not used the overlay in our implementation of the load balancing, but allowed the super- peer to choose peers responsible for public state management and to explicitly transfer trust to those peers by notifying the game group. This approach solved several trust management problems, and allowed for load balancing that was not vulnerable to hot spots in the DHT.
Conclusion
Many applications that could benefit from the P2P computing model cannot use it because of concerns of security and fairness. In this paper, we have attempted to show how a very sensitive application (a P2P Massive Multiplayer Online game) may be protected from unfair user behavior. However, let us note that while our research focused on P2P MMO games as a challenging application, the developed trust management protocols could be applied in other P2P applications. An example could be P2P auctions that have many properties similar to the discussed conditional or concealed game state in MMO games. Future work may consider applying trust enforcement mechanisms in P2P e-commerce applications.
In our proposed trust management architecture, we have been forced to abandon the pure peer-to-peer approach for a hybrid approach (or an approach with superpeers). However, we have attempted to minimize the role of the centralized trusted components. The result is a system that, in our opinion, preserves much of the performance benefits of the P2P approach, as exemplified by the P2P platform for MMO games proposed in [3] . At the same time, it is much more secure than the basic P2P platform.
We see trust as yet another security functionality (such as privacy or authentication) that can be provided by known cryptographic primitives. The approach that we have tried to use for trust management in peerto-peer games is "trust enforcement". It considerably different from previous work on trust management in P2P computing, that has usually relied on reputation. However, reputation systems are vulnerable to first time cheating, and are difficult to use in P2P computing because peers have to compute reputation on the basis of incomplete information (unless the reputation is maintained by superpeers). Instead, we have attempted to use cryptographic primitives to assure a detection of unfair behavior and to enable trust.
The proposed trust management architecture has been validated by an implementation in a practical P2P MMO game. The performance of the implementation has been tested and it was found that the use of trust enforcement incurs a practical performance overhead. Therefore, the use of the proposed trust enforcement mechanisms is indeed practical in P2P games. As the sizes of game groups increases, the delays due to overlay routing begin to dominate over additional delays due to the use of cryptography.
The mechanisms that form the proposed trust management architecture work on a periodic or irregular basis (like periodic verification of private players by the coordinator or Byzantine agreement after a veto). Also, the possibility of cheating is not excluded, but rather the trust enforcement mechanisms aim to detect cheating and punish the cheating player by excluding him from the game. In some cases, cheating may still not be detected (if the verification, as proposed, is done on a random basis); however, we believe that the existence of trust enforcement mechanisms may be sufficient to deter players from cheating and to enable trust, like (usually) in the real-world case of law enforcement.
